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gious belief should shut out any one from testifying; ' and when all
men, in the possession of their reasoning faculties, understanding
the nature and believing in the sanction of an oath, shall be permitted to speak that which they do know.
Then only will our system of jurisprudence be perfect. Then
only will be established the great idea, that man, formed in the
image of his maker, should cherish faith in his fellow. Then only
will arrive that epoch prophecied by a golden poet of a golden
age: 2
"1Jam fides,
-

-

et neglecta rodire Virtus

Audet."

And, then, only will be vindicated the majesty and splendor of
that LAW, whose " seat is the bosom of God; whose voice is the
harmony of the world."'3
B.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

District Court of the United States, Southern District of OhioOctober Term, 1856.
THE UNITED STATES VS. CHARLES K. SMITH.

1. The act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1797, provides, that in a suit by the
United States to recover a balance due on the books of the Treasury Department,
the defendant cannot give in evidence as a set-off, a claim against the government, which has not previously been presented to, and disallowed by the proper
accounting officer, without proving that it was not before in his power to produce
the voucher for such claim, and that he was prevented from exhibiting it, "by
absence from the United States, or some unavoidable accident."
2. The rejection of an account or claim against the United States, by an accounting
officer of the government, authorized by a special act of Congress to adjust the
same on equitable principles, does not preclude the defendant, when sued, from
setting up such rejected claim or account, as a set-off.
IIt has recently been decided by Judge Manly, in North Carolina, that by the
laws of that State, Universalists are not competent witnesses.
H
Ior. Carm.Sec.
We do not entirely concur with our correspondent, but we present his wellwritten paper to our readers for their consideration.-Eds. Am. Law BRey,.
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3. There is no authority, either in the executive or judicial department of the
government, to allow a claim against the United States, which is prohibited by
law.
4. The legislation of Congress prohibits any extra compensation to an officer, for
services performed, properly pertaining by law, to his office.
6. The defendant, as Secretary of Minnesota Territory, having a fixed salary as
such, was not entitled to claim in addition thereto, the salary of governor, during
the absence of that officer; as the act organizing the Territory made it the duty
of the secretary, "in case of the death, removal, resignation, or necessary
absence of the governor," to discharge the duties of that office, without any provision for an increase of compensation to the secretary.
6. The proviso in the 2d section of the act of September 30, 1850, expressly prohibits the allowance of double salaries in all cases.
7. The act organizing the Territory of Minnesota, made the Secretary the disbursing officer of the Territorial government, and he cannot claim a commission on
such disbursements.
8. Where an officer, with a salary payable quarterly, is appointed for four years,
"unless sooner removed by the President," and a removal is made during a
current quarter, he is not entitled to his salary to the end of the quarter.
9. By the organic act of Minnesota Territory, the general government became
pledged to defray "the expenses of the legislative assembly, the printing of the
laws, and other incidental expenses;" and the defendant is entitled to a credit
for services rendered, or expenditures made, within the fair scope and meaning
of these terms, so far as they did not pertain to the office of secretary of the
Territory; but the words "other incidental expenses," must be restricted to such
expenies as were incidental to the legislative assembly and the printing of the
laws.
10. The 2nd section of the act of 29th of August, 1842, which applies to territories then, or afterwards to be organized, provides that no act of the legislature of
a Territory shall be deemed of sufficient authority for a payment by the'national
treasury, and requires proper vouchers and proof of the same, to be exhibited
to the accounting officers of the proper department.
11. In a judicial case involving the accounts of a former secretary of a Territory, in which credits are claimed, which have been rejected by the treasury
department, the fact that such credits have not been embraced in the estimate
required by the organic act of the Territory to be previously made by the secretary of the treasury, does not preclude their allowance by a jury, if not objectionable on other grounds.

Mr. D. 0. Horton, District Attorney, for the United States.
Messrs. Corwin &Probasco,Judge Johnson, and Mr. Spooner,
for defendant.
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J., charged the jury as follows:
This suit is brought on the official bond of the defendant, as late
secretary of the Territory of Minnesota, dated the 81st of March,
1849. A balance of $4,078 41 is claimed as due to the United
States; and treasury statements are in evidence, showing such
balance against the defendant. The defendant exhibits claims
against the government, exceeding the amount of such balance, and
insists on a judgment in his favor, for the sum alleged to be due
him.
The larger portions of the items of claim exhibited in the defendant's account, have been passed upon and disallowed by the
treasury department, under the provisions of a special act of Congress, authorizing their adjustment on equitable principles. The
defendant also claims an allowance of about one thousand dollars,
embracing items of charge against the United States, which have
not been presented for payment or allowance at the treasury department, and consequently, have not been rejected by it. This
latter class of vouchers was permitted to go in evidence to the jury,
upon a suggestion that the defendant would be able to show reasons
for their non-presentation, which would render them admissible,
and with the understanding, that otherwise they were to be withdrawn from the consideration of the jury.
The 4th section of the act of Congress of the 3d of March,
1797, 1st vol. L. U. S. p. 515, provides "that in suits between the
United States and individuals, no claim for a credit shall be admitted upon trial, but such as shall appear to have been presented to
the accounting officers of the treasury for their examination, and by
them disallowed, in whole or in part, unless it should be proved to
the satisfaction of the court, that the defendant is, at the time of
the trial, in possession of vouchers, not before in his power to procure, and that he was prevented from exhibiting a claim for such
credit at the treasury, by absence from the United States, or some
unavoidable accident." No proof has been exhibited by the defendant, which brings the items referred to within either of the
exceptions stated in the foregoing provision of the act of Congress,
and they must therefore be entirely excluded from the consideration
LEAVITT,
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of the jury. The law is imperative on this subject, and vests no
discretion in the court. There may be cases in which its operation
may savour of harshness, or even of injustice, but there can be no
doubt that such a provision is necessary to prevent the presentation
of fraudulent or fictitious claims upon the government.
The other items of charge in the defendant's account having
been presented to, and disallowed by, the proper accounting officer,
under an act of Congress authorizing their settlement upon principles of equity, are properly in controversy in this suit. Such
rejection of these items, by the treasury department, is not decisive
of the rights of the claimant. The Constitution of the United
States vests all the judicial power of the government in the courts
of the Union; and it is the unquestionable right of the citizen, in
a suit brought by the United States for the recovery of a balance
claimed, if his credits have been disallowed by the accounting officer, to present them for the decision of a court and jury.
There is an obvious necessity that the government should hold its
subordinate agents to- great strictness, and the most rigid accountability in all transactions involving official liability; and in discharging this duty, the highest executive officers must be guided by law,
and are not at liberty to adopt their own views of right and justice
as the basis of their action. Even in cases of reference to them by
act of Congress, with a power to adjust and settle accounts on
principles of equity, no authority is thereby implied to allow a
claim against the government which is expressly, or by clear implication, prohibited by law. And the same principle of action
applies to and must govern the Court of the United States in adjudicating between the government and a citizen, as to matters of
account. If the allowance of a claim is forbidden by law, a court and
jury cannot give it legal validity; but if not thus prohibited, and
it is in its character just and equitable, though it may have been
rejected by the proper officer, it may be allowed in a judicial tribunal, if properly authenticated by evidence. When the government
comes before such a tribunal as a litigant party, its position is that
of equality with the citizen ; and it is entitled to no special immunities, unless expressly conferred by law. If it shall happen, that
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even the application of these liberal principles in such a controversy, shall fail to secure to the individual citizen the full measure
of justice, his only remedy is an application to the legislative department of the government; the powers of which are ample to
administer aright on the most comprehensive principles of equity,
with no limitations, except those imposed by the constitution.
The items of the account exhibited by the defendant, and on
which the jury are to pass, are numerous, and include claims for
various services and expenditures, as secretary of the Territory of
Minnesota, embracing a period between the 31st of March, 1849the date of his appointment to office-and the 14th of November,
1851, when he was superseded by the appointment of another person. I will not detain the jury'by a special reference to all the
credits claimed by the defendant in his account now exhibited, but
having noticed a few of them, in respect to which the construction
of the court has been called for, will state some general principles
of law applicable to the whole account, which may afford a satisfactory guide to the jury, in their considerations as to its proper
adjustment.
I may remark here, that it is insisted by the counsel for the government, that all the items of charge in the defendant's account
are liable to the objection, either, that they involve claims for services rendered by him as secretary of the Territory, legally pertaining to the office, and for which he is entitled to no compensation beyond the salary given him by law-or, if not included in
this class, the gervices rendered and expenditures made, were in
virtue of laws or resolutions passed by the territorial legislature,
for which there is no legal claim on the treasury of the United
States.
It may now be regarded as a principle, which admits of no question, that no officer of the United States, having a fixed salary, is
entitled to any extra compensation for the performance of services
or duties, which pertain to his office by law. It is wholly unnecessary to refer to the legislation of Congress, or the decisions of the
Courts of the Union on this subject. The incumbent of an office is
bound to perform all the duties belonging to it, without extra com-
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pensation. No mani is under any necessity to accept an office, but
having accepted it, the obligation rests upon him to discharge its
duties for the remuneration which the law provides. He accepts it
with a knowledge of the pay or salary attached to it, and, though
its dities may be onerous, and the compensation inadequate, if be
chooses to retain the office, he must be content with what the law
gives.
Some of the charges in the defendant's account are clearly within
the objections just stated, and cannot, therefore, be allowed by the
jury. I will notice very briefly, some of the principal items which,
in the judgment of the court, must be rejected on this ground.
The charge of $1,004 for salary as acting governor of the Territory, during the absence of the governor, is clearly within the prohibition adverted to. There are two distinct periods of service
charged by the defendant, for which he claims the salary of the
governor, in addition to that of Secretary 6f the Territory. The
first is, from the 8th of November, 1849, to the 12th of February,
1850, amounting to' $645-the second, from the 10th of April,
1851, to the 2d of June following, amounting to $358 83. The
charge for the latter period is within the operation of the proviso of
the 2d section of the act of September 30, 1850, and its allowance
is expressly forbidden by it. This proviso is in these words-" That
bereafter the proper accounting officers of the treasury, or other pay
officers of the United States, shall in no case allow any pay to one
individual, for the salaries of two different officers, on account of
having performed the duties thereof, at the same time."
But, without reference to this act of Congress, the whole of tlis
charge is liable to the objections, that the service was one which he
was bound to perform, as Secretary of the Territory, and for which
no extra compensation can be allowed. The third section of the
act for the organization -of Minnesota territory, authorizes and
requires the secretary to discharge the duties of the executive, "in
case of the death, removal,.resignation, or necessary absence of the
governor from the Territory." The defendant took the office of
secretary, knowing, that in any of the contingencies specified, the
duties of governor would devolve on him. And the law made no
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provision for any additional compensation, in that event. In assuming the office of Secretary of the Territory, the defendant became
bound to act as governor, if necessary under the law, as fully as he
was obliged to discharge any other duty, as secretary. It pertained
to the office of secretary, though not strictly within the legitimate
range of its duties. The salary certainly was less than the labour
and responsibility required, but this is an evil which this court and
jury cannot remedy, without usurping legislative powers.
There is another item, $557, charged in the defendant's account
as a commission of one per cent. on funds disbursed by him, as
secretary. This is liable to the objection stated to the foregoing
item. By the eleventh section of the organic act of the territory,
the secretary is expressly made the disbursing officer of the territory,
and is required to account to the Secretary of the Treasury of the
United States for the manner in which the funds have been expended.
This was, therefore, one of the duties required of him by law, as
secretary, for which he is not entitled to any extra allowance.
I will here notice briefly another charge, in the defendant's
account, that must be rejected. I refer to his claim for salary as
secretary, for the whole of the quarter ending the 31st of December,
1851. It seems he entered on his duties as secretary, in March,
1849, was removed by the President the latter part of October,
1851, but continued in the actual performance of his duties till the
14th of November, in the last named year. The defendant has been
allowed his salary by the treasury department, to the date of his
removal, but it tias been rejected for the balance of the quarter.
No doubt can exist to his right to it to the 14th of November, when
he was in fact superseded by his successor. It is insisted, however,
that he is entitled to pay for the whole quarter. The argument is,
that where an officer whose salary is payable quarterly, is removed
by the act of the President before the expiration of a current quarter, he is entitled to his pay to the end of it. This is believed to be
in opposition to the uniform practice of the government in such
cases. I do not propose to discuss the constitutional question of
the power of the President to remove from office, at his own will,
without presenting to the- Senate the grounds of the removal, and
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obtaining its approval of the act. The defendant, conformably to
the act organizing Minnesota Territory, was appointed to the office
of secretary for four years, "unless sooner removed by the President
of the United States." For many years past, this has been the
usual mode of commissioning executive and ministerial officers; and,
the power of removal, with or without cause, has been freely exercised by those who have held the presidential office, for the last
thirty years. True, there were those at an early period of our
national government, who contended. that the spirit, if not the letter
of the constitution, required the President to submit the causes of
removal from office to the Senate; and that, as it was only by and
with the advice and consent of that body, that an appointment could
be made, the same formality was required in removing from office.
Although there may be some, at this day, who maintain this view,
the current of opinion seems to set strongly in the opposite direction..
The practice of the government has been so long settled, and is so
generally acquiesced in, that there is little probability of a change.
And if conceded that the power of removal, without restriction or
limitation, belongs to the President, the official duties of the incumbent, and with it, his right to salary or compensation, cease when
the successor assumes the office. The defendant's claim for salary
from the 14th of November to the 31st of December, will, therefore,
be rejected by the jury.
Before passing to the consideration of the other part of the defendant's account, I will notice an item of $116, charged as the expenses
of a visit to Washington, to procure the funds appropriated by Congress for the support of the territorial government, for the year
1850. From some cause, great delay had occurred in remitting the
funds appropriated, to the seat of government of the territory. To
hasten this remittance, the defendant made the journey to Washington. Its necessity is not very obvious, so far as there is any
evidence on the subject. Bat, if the jury believe the public interests
of the territory required the journey, there is no reason why the.
defendant should not be reimbursed to the amount of his actual;
expenses.
It would detain the jury unreasonably, and, as I think, unneces-
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sarily, to notice in detail all the remaining items of charge in the
defendant's account. -In their retirement they will have the opportunity of giving to the account, and the vouchers which sustain it,
a critical inspection. So far as any of these may be for services
or duties performed, belonging to the office of the defendant, as
Secretary of the Territory, they will be disallowed, on the grounds
already fully stated. There are others, however, which stand on
another basis, and which present a different question for the consideration of the court and jury. Their allowance or disallowance
will depend mainly on the provisions of the act of Congress for the
organization of the Territory of Minnesota. To such of them as
bear upon the items in controversy, I will now briefly ask the attention of the jury.
This organic act was approved and took effect the 3d of March,
1849. The fourth section vests the legislative power of the territory in the governor and a legislative assembly. The sixth section
provides, that 'the legislative power shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, consistent with the constitution of the United
States, and the provisions of said act; and requires that all the
acts of the governor and legislative Council shall be submitted to
the Congress of the United States; and if disapproved, shall be null
and void. By the twelfth section, the laws in force in the Territory
of Wisconsin, at the date of her admission into the Union, are
declared to be in force in Minnesota, so far as they were compati'le with the act organizing the last named territory, subject to
,imendments and repeal by the legislature. By the same section,
-he laws of the United States were extended over, and declared to
)e in force, in Minnesota, so far as they were applicable. Among
the provisions of the eleventh section is one declaring that there
shall be an annual appropriation by Congress of one thousand dollars, to be expended by the governor to defray the contingent
expenses of the Territory; and also, annually, a sufficient sum "to
defray the expenses of the legislative assembly, the printing of the
laws, and other incidental expenses." This appropriation is to be
made upon the estimate of the secretary of the treasury, and to be
expended by the Secretary of the Territory. The seventeenth section
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appropriates five thousand dollars for the purchase of a library for
the benefit of the territory.
These are all the provisions of the organic act, which it is material
to notice. The act, as is obvious, is based on the admitted doctrine
that a territory is in some sense, a ward of the general government,
and that while in its state of pupilage, the primary and paramount
power of legislation over it, is vested in congress. The act of Congress, however, granted to the people of Minnesota territory the
right to elect a local legislature, in which was vested the ordinary
powers of legislation, subject to the restrictions and limitations
specified. Among the powers thus conferred on the legislative body,
was the power of taxation for legitimate territorial purposes. But,
the obligation was assumed by the general government to provide
for the payment of the salaries and compensation of all the officers,
whose appointments were authorized by the act. It was also pledged
to defray the contingent expenses of the territory, to an amount
not exceeding one thousand dollars, and also, "the expenses of the
legislative assembly, the printing of the laws, and other incidental
expenses."
One of the important'questions presented in this case is, whether the
charges contained in the defendant's account which have not before
been brought specially to the notice of the jury, and upon which the
views of the court have been stated, are fairly within the scope and
range of the words just quoted from the organic act. The jury will
observe from an inspection of the vouchers for that part of the
account referred to, that they embrace charges for services rendered,
and expenditures made, by the defendant, alleged to be necessarily
connected with, or incidental to, the administration of the territorial government. Without referring specifically to these items, I
may remark here, that so far as these claims are for services outside of the defendant's official duties as secretary, and may come
within the designation of "1expenses of the legislative assembly, the
printing of the laws, or other incidental expenses," I see no objection
to their allowance, if sustained by proof to the satisfaction of the
jury. The act of Congress sanctions the payment of expenses,
which may be classified under these lheads, from the n;ational
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treasury; and within the limitations already indicated, they would
seem to be proper items of charge against the United States. But,
it is clear, Congress did not intend to impose an obligation on the
general government, to meet every expenditure which might be
authorized by the territorial legislature. That body was vested
with a discretionary power of legislation, in regard to the local or
internal interests of the territory; but any expenditure authorized
for such purposes, was to be paid out of the territorial treasury.
And it is obvious, that an unlimited power in the legislature of a
territory to authorize expenditures, which were to be paid by the
general government, would lead to great abuses, and impose a
grievous burden on the national treasury. There is not only no
such power in the territorial governments, but Congress has expressly
provided, that in reference to the appropriation of money for
expenditures in a territory, to be paid by the general government,
the acts of a territorial legislature are not conclusive. By the
second section of the act of the 29th of August, 1842 (5 vol. L. U.
S. p. 541) it is expressly required, as to all territories, then or
afterwards to be organized, that the accounts for such expenditures
shall be settled and adjusted at the treasury department; and it is
provided, "that no act, resolution, or order of the legislature of any
territory, directing the expenditure of the sum, shall be deemed a
sufficient authority for such disbursement, but sufficient vouchers
and proof for the same shall be required by said accounting
officers."
It will be the duty of the jury, in reference to the class of charges
now referred to, to determine from an examination of the vouchers,
and other evidence adduced by the defendant, whether they arc
fairly comprehended under the heads of "expenses of the legislative
assembly, the printing of the laws, and other incidental expenses."
It is difficult, if not impossible, to define with certainty what may
be rightfully included in these terms. I should not probably render
-hojury any essential aid, if I were to attempt to prescribe a rule
for their action, in this regard. I may remark generally, t.at it is
evidently within the spirit of the language used inthe act c1 C-ngrcs:, tLat the expenses incurred under any of the head ,- ta.ed
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should be necessary and proper, and the sums reasonable. This
would necessarily lead to the rejection of any vouchers for expenditures for purposes not required in the proper discharge of the duties
of the legislature of the territory, and not in promotion of the public
interests. So, in relation to the printing of the laws passed by the
legislature. The expenses incurred must have reference, and be
limited to, the object stated. The words, "other incidental expenses," are of comprehensive import, and were, without doubt,
adopted by Congress, to provide for any necessary expenses which
could not be foreseen, and specifically pointed out. The fair construction of these words, in the connection in which they are used,
would seem not to justify the conclusion, that they were intended
to include all expenditures which might be deemed incidental to
the administration of the government of the territory. They must
be limited in their import to the necessary incidental expenses of
the legislative assembly and the printing the laws. Within the
limits thus indicated, if the evidence of the expenditures and services
is satisfactory to thb jury, and the charges are not within any of
the prohibitions previously stated, they would seem to have the
sanction of law, and may properly be allowed as credits to the
defendant.
It is proper that I should here briefly notice an objection urgedto the defendant's account, by the counsel for the United States,
founded on the position, that they have not been included in any
estimate made by the secretary of the treasury, and cannot, therefore, be viewed as legal set-offs to the claim presented by the government. It is true, the act organizing the territory of Minnesota
requires the secretary of the treasury to make an estimate, in
advance of the appropriation by Congress, of the expenses of the
territorial government. Without discussing this subject, it may be
sufficient to state, that the duty enjoined on the secretary of the
treasury is directory to, and obligatory on him. But, if he omits
to make an estimate, or if.
that estimate proves insufficient to meet
the first expenditures contemplated by the act of Congress, it affords
no reason why the claims of an individual, coming fairly within the
scope and intention of the act, should not be allowed. The question
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now presented arises in a judicial case, and the true inquiry is not
whether there has been a previous estimate, embracing the charges
claimed, but whether they are just, and not within any express
prohibition of law.
I may also refer to the letters from the comptroller of the treasury,
addressed to the defendant, while he held the office of secretary of
the territory, which are in evidence. These, it is insisted, authorize
a part of the expenditures charged in the defendant's account. I
shall not notice, in detail, the contents of these letteirs. It will be
proper for the jury to refer to them, in their retirement, as a part
of the evidence in this case. Whatever may be their purport, it
cannot be claimed for them, that they invalidate the positive provisions of law. So far, however, as they may be viewed as authorizing any of the charges or expenditures of the defendant, they may
properly be considered by the jury; and as to items concerning
which they might otherwise be in doubt, may exercise an influence
in their decision.
With these views, the case is committed to the jury. They will
apply the law, as I have attempted to state it, to the evidence before
them, and decide what portion of the credits claimed by the
defendant shall be allowed, and what shall be rejected.
(The jury returned a verdict for the United States for $1,536.)

In

the District Court of the United States for the 0Jaryland
District.

THE PHILADELPHIA AND HAYRE DE GRACE STEAM' TOW-BOAT COM[PANY
vs.

THE PHILADELPHIA,

WILMINGTON

AND

BALTIMORE

RAILROAD

COMPANY.
1. The Admiralty has jurisdiction over marine torts, which may be defined to be
unlawful acts, injurious to others, independent of contract, happening or being
committed upon the sea or tide-water.
2. A steam-tug, regularly licensed under the Acts of Congress, plying between
ports in different States, is within the provision of the constitution as to the
regulation of commerce, and the observance of the special State laws regulating
Sunday labor, is not compulsory upon such steam-tug; but it would have bcen
otheruise had the tug been engaged in towing vessels between ports of the same
State.
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3. Where the respondents had contracted with certain parties for the building of a
bridge across the Susquehanna river, and the bridge contractors, at the request
and for the convenience of the respondents' engineers, had driven in the bed of
the river a "sight-pile," upon which a steam tug-boat run, without fault on her
part, and was thereby much damaged, held, that the negligence of the contractors
and engineers, in not removing the '- sight-pile," was the negligence of the
respondents, the relation of master and servant being established by the facts.

.MJessrs. Dobbin, and Talbott, for libellants.
Hessrs. Schley, Donaldson and Evans, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GILrS, J.-This cause has occupied the attention of the court for
several days, and has been fully and ably argued by the several
counsel engaged in it; and since the adjournment of the court yesterday, I have examined the various authorities to which I had
been referred, and the several cases cited by the counsel; and I
will no announce the conclusion to Which I have arrived. This is
a libel filed by the libellants, (a company incorporated by the State
of Pennsylvania, and who are engaged in towing canal boats from
the end of the Tide Water Canal, at Iavre de Grace, to Philadelphia, through the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal,) to recover
damages for an injury which the steam tow-boat " Superior" (one
of the boats of their line) received from a pile placed in the Susquehanna river by the respondents, or their agents. The evidence
showed, that on Sunday morning, the 11th of May, 1856, the said
tow-boat left her wharf at Havre de Grace, with thirty-one canal
boats in tow, for the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal; that she
had just got into the stream, and had shaped her course down
towards the bay, when she suddenly received a shock, by striking
against something in the waLter, and was found immediately to leak
so rapidly that the bilge-pumps could not free her; and that, to
prevent her sinking in deep water, the captain immediately cast
loose from the canal boats, and run the steamer to the wharf at
Iavre de Grace, where he had wintered his boat the previous winter, and where she sank in five minutes. That lie attaied her to
the wharf with two ropes and fourhawsers, new, and of the strongest
kind, but that in the course of an hour and a half, ,-he snal)!icd
these fastenings and slid out into deep watc-r, where sl:2 l:ay until
she was raised, some twenty days after. That she was raised at a
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cost of $1,567, and sold, unrepaired, at Havre de Grace, for
$1,714. A survey was held on her after she was raised, by
experienced men, who estimated the costs of repairing her at $2,830,
and who recommended that she should be brought to Baltimore to
be repaired, as there was no marine-railway atl Havre de Grace.
That her injury was caused by her running against a pile stuck
down in the bed of the Susquehanna river, in the place where vessels usually pass, in twenty feet water, and that the top of the said
pile was about five feet below the surface of the water; and there
was no buoy or other visible object to indicate its presence. That
it was one of the eight piles used by the engineers of the respondents, when laying out the foundations of the bridge they intended
to build across the Susquehanna river; that it had been put down
by the contractors for the building of the said bridge, but they did
so at the request of the engineer of the respondents, and for their
convenience; and the said pile, with the other eight piles, were
furnished by the respondents; that the placing or removing of these
eight piles formed no part of the contract of the said contractors,
and that the piles to which that contract had reference, had been
sawed off, or removed previous to this accident.
There were some other facts given in evidence, but they were not
important, and it is not necessary to recite them here, as those I
have presented raise all the questions upon which the case was
argued, and are sufficient for the purposes of this opinion.
Four defences have been taken by the respondents to the
recovery of the claim of the libellants in this case; three deny any
right of recovery at all, and the fourth and last one denies the right
of libellants to recover the whole amount of the claim (some $11,000)
set forth in their libel.
The first defence taken is, that this court has no jurisdiction of
this case, and that if respondents are liable at all, it is only in a
court of common law, in an action of trespass on the case.
The learned counsel for the respondents contended that the
remedy, if a suit had been brought in a court of common law,
Would be an action on the case, and not trespass; in such a
case this court would have no jurisdiction.
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That the torts of which courts of admiralty have jurisdiction,
are those where the agency of man is immediate and direct in their
commission, and does not embrace cases where the injury is only
consequential. Now, it is laid down in all the elementary writers
on admiralty jurisdiction in this country, that in all cases of contract, the jurisdiction of the admiralty court depends upon the subject matter of the contract, and in all cases of torts, the jurisdiction depends upon the locality. And that over marine torts, the
I need only refer, for this
admiralty courts have jurisdiction.
position, to Conkling's Admiralty, page 21, Benedict's Admiralty,
sec. 308, and to the case of Waring and others vs. Clarke,
which also decided that not only torts "super altum mare" (as in
England,) but those upon tide-water, "infra corpus comitatus,"
belong to the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts.
Now, what are torts ? F r a true and concise definition, I refer
to the second volume of Bouvier's Institutes, one of the best elementary books we have. On page 491 of that volume, in treating
of wrongs, the writer makes this explanation:
"Tort, a term of signification somewhat similar to wrong, is an
unlawful act, injurious to another, independent of contract. Torts
miy be committed with force, as a trespass, which may be an injury
to the person, such as assault, battery and imprisonment; or they
m-y be committed without force; torts of this latter kind are to the
absolute or relative rights of persons, or to personal property in
possession or reversion, or to real property corporeal, or incorporeal
in possession or reversion; these injuries may be either by nonfe.zance, malfeasance or misfeasance."
A marine tort, then, is an unlawful act, injurious to another,
independent of contract, happening or being committed upon the
sea or upon tide-water. Such was, no doubt, the view talen by
Judge Grier, in the case of Trantine vs. The Lake, reported in 2
Wallace, jr. 52. That was the case of a vessel (The Lake) entering a dock in which a smaller vessel was at that time lying, and
which dock contained a rise in the bed of the stream, in which but
little water was left at low tide, so that when th~e tide weflt out, a
vesse1 lying there would careen over on its side; and that this was
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known to the consignees of the vessel, who had directed her to be
placed in the dock; when the tide went out, the Lake fell over on
the smaller vessel and injured it, and for which damages thus caused,
the libel was filed. Judge Grier held the Lake responsible, and
decreed accordingly. A similar case would be, where a vessel was
anchored in the stream, near a port much frequented by vessels,
and showed no light or signal at night; and another vessel, in the
darkness of night, passing in or out of said port, without any want
of care, should run against the anchored vessel, and be thereby
injured. The vessel at anchor, and her owners, would certainly be
responsible. I have no doubt, therefore, that this court has jurisdiction of the case.
The next defence is, that as this steamer was towing on Sabbath,
and the injury was received on that day, there can be no recovery
in this case; because said steamer was acting in violation of the law
of Maryland, passed in 1723, which, in its 10th section, provided:
" That no person whatsoever shall work, or do any bodily labor on
the Sabbath day, commonly called Sunday, works of necessity and
charity always excepted." The evidence showed, that the "Superior" was regularly licensed for the coasting trade. There was
some evidence that there had been a breach in the tide-water canal,
which caused the canal-boats to accumulate at Hlavre de Grace,
and that the Superior was under the necessity of making this trip
on Sunday, to relieve this pressure. But in the view of this Court,
that is not such a work of necessity as would bring the case within
the exception of the act of 1723.
The libellants had the monopoly of this towing business between
Hlavre de Grace and Philadelphia, and were bound to look to all
the contingencies of the service, and provide boats sufficient for it.
The question then remains, was the " Superior" amenable to this
act, and bound to obey its provisions ? To solve this question truly,
we must first see what her license authorized her to do, and what
force and effect that license had, when coming in conflict with a
law of this State. It is perfectly clear, that if this boat had been
engaged in the domestic commerce of this State, towing barges or
boats from the Eastern Shore to Baltimore, or from iavre de
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Grace to Baltimore, the provisions of this law would have been
obligatory upon her. But by the 8th section of article 1st of the Constitution of the United States, the power "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States and with the
Indian Tribes," is given to Congress. This power is an exclusive
power; and no act of a State, which in any way would seek to
regulate, restrain or limit foreign commerce, or the commerce
between the States, can be of any binding effect, except it be
adopted by, or otherwise receives the sanction of Congress. This
principle was decided in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, reported
in 9 Wheat., page 1. That case also decided, that the power given
to Congress to regulate commerce, extends to vessels propelled by
steam, as well as those navigated by the instrumentality of wind
and sails; and also, that a license under the Acts of Congress for
regulating the coasting trade, gives a permission to carry on that
trade. The opinion in that case was delivered by Chief Justice
Marshall. This was in 1824. But, recently, this question has
been again brought before the Supreme Court, and was there very
fully argued, and received the careful examination of that learned
tribunal. I allude to the'Passenger Cases decided in 1849, and
reported in 7 Howard's Supreme Court Reports. The cases commence on page 288 of that report, and embrace two hundred and
ninety pages, nearly one-third of the volume.
The Judges gave their opinions seriatim, but Justices McLean,
Catron, McKinley, Wayne and Grier, united in the opinion, that
the laws of Massachusetts and New York, brought up to review in
those cases, were void, as they were regulations of foreign commerce, and therefore beyond the constitutional powers of the States.
I can only here make two short extracts from these able opinions.
On page 400, Judge McLean announces the conclusion to which
lie arrived, in the following language:
"Whether I consider the nature and object of the commercial
power, the class of powers with which it is placed, the decision of
the court in the case Gibbons vs. Ogden, reiterated in Brown vs.
The State of .Iarvyland, and afterwards re-asserted by Mr. Justice
Story, who participated in those decisions, I am brought to the
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conclusion, that the power 'to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States,' by the constitution, is
exclusively vested in Congress." And on page 414, Judge Wayne,
in announcing the conclusion to which he and a majority of the
court had arrived upon this most important question, says: "That
the power in Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, includes navigation upon the high
seas, and in the bays, harbors, lakes and navigable waters within
the United States, and that any law by a State, in any way affecting the right of navigation, or subjecting the exercise of the right
to a condition, is contrary to the aforesaid grant."
Now, it must be admitted, that if this law of Maryland, for the
observance of the Sabbath, can be made applicable to vessels
engaged in the commerce between the States, then they are made
subject to a regulation which Congress never authorized or sanctioned. Under her license, what were the rules and regulations by
which this vessel was bound, and under which she was authorized
to sail ? These regulations will be found in the Act of September
1st, 1789, section 22, and in the 2d and 3d sections of the Act of
March 2d, 1819. But there is no provision in these, or in any
other Acts of Congress, that she should not sail on Sunday. I
consider, therefore, that the steamer of the libellants was not bound
to obey the law of Maryland, to which reference has been made,
and that there is no valid objection to the recovery of the libellants
for the damages they have suffered on that ground.
Reference has been made, in the course of the argument, to the
quarantine and pilot laws of the several States, which we recognized as valid and binding upon the commerce of the country. But
an examination of the Acts of Congress, will show that they have
been sanctioned and adopted by Congress. By the 4th section of
the Act of August 7,1789, it is enacted: "That all pilots in the
bays, &c., of the United States, shall continue to be regulated in
conformity with the existing laws of the States, respectively, in
which such pilots may be, &c., &c., until further legislation shall be
made by Congress." And by the Act of the 28th February, 1799,
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the quarantine and health laws of the several States were sanctioned and approved.
The next objection taken to the recovery of this claim by libellants is, that the contractors for building the bridge are the responsible parties, and not the respondents. And in the argument of
this point, I was referred to some twelve English decisions, and
three American cases. I have examined these cases, and according to the view I take of the facts of this case, I do not deem them
applicable. The law they lay down is not disputed by the libellant's counsel, nor could it be controverted in a case where similar
questions might arise. In nearly all of them the question was,
whether the party committing the tort was the servant of the
defendants, or whether he was not the servant or agent of another
party, acting under an independent contract. Of this character
are the cases of Bapson vs. Cubitt, Reported in 9 Meeson and
Welsby, 709; Reedie vs. London and .North-Western Railway
Company, reported in 4 Exchequer Reports, 244; Kfnight vs. Pox,
5 Exchequer Reports, 721; Quarmanvs. Burnett and another, 6
Mees. and Welsby, 499; and the late case of Steele vs. The Soith-EasternRailway Company, reported in 32d English Law and Equity
Reports, 366. In all these cases, except Quarman vs. Burnett,
the work from which the injury resulted had been performed by the
employee of one who had a contract for the execution of said work.
Quarman vs. Burnett, was the case of an owner of a carriage hiring
horses of a job-man, who provided a driver; and the owner of the
carriage was held not responsible for an injury caused by the carelessness of the driver.
The case of M.filligan vs. Wedge, 12 Ad. &Ell. 737, (40 E. C.
L. Rep. 177,) was the case of a butcher who had employed a licensed
drover to drive him a bullock he had bought at market, and the
drover's boy, by his negligence, suffered the bullock to run into the
plaintiff's show-room, where he did considerable damage. It was
held that the owner of the bullock was not responsible.
The three American cases to which I have been referred are
Blake vs. Perris,in 1 Selden, 48; The .-iayor -'c.
of 1bew York vs.
Bailey, 2 Denio, 434, and Lowell vs. Te Boston and Lowell Rail-
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road Company, 23 Pickering, 21. These cases maintain the same
principle upon which the English cases were decided. And in the
cases in Denio and Pickering, the defendants were held responsible,
on the ground that a party is responsible for an injury resulting
from the negligence and unskillfulness of his servants or agents. 1
Now, the evidence in this case, in my opinion, clearly shows that
the steamer was injured by running upon a sight-pile, which had
been placed in the river by the direction and for the use and convenience of the engineers of the respondents, and was not placed
there by the contractor, in the execution of his contract for building the bridge. It was clearly, therefore, the negligence of the
engineers in not removing this pile, when they had ceased to use
it; and for the injury resulting from this negligence of their agents,
I think the respondents are answerable. The only question remaining, is the amount of damages to which the libellants are entitled.
The rule of damages which has been laid down by the Supreme
Court in collision cases, seems to me to be a just one in this case.
I refer to the case of Williamson vs. Barnett, 13 Howard, 101. I
shall allow the libellants the following items:
.
.
.
.
Furniture lost,
Cost of raising steamer,
Net earning for 60 days, which it would take to raise
.
.
-.
and repair her,
-Necessary repairs, to place her in as good a condition
.
.
.
as before the accident,
Cost of taking her to Baltimore, estimated at

$500 00
1,567 36
1,890 00
2,890 00
153 00
$7,000 36

For which sum I will sign a decree. I do not think that, under
all the circumstances, the libellants were justified in selling her at
Iavre de Grace ; and I therefore decline to allow them the amount
claimed by them, growing out of that sale, and the small amount
realized from it. I think her leak might have been stopped, so far
I See the very late case of Hilliard v. Richardson, 3 Grey's Rep. 354.-Eds. Am.
Law Beg.
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as to have enabled the libellants to bring her round to Baltimore,
where she could be taken upon the Railway and repaired; and the
intelligent gentlemen who examined her at the request of the libellants, recommended this course, and gave it as their opinion, that
there would be but little risk in bringing her to Baltimore.

In the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
FREEMAN CLARKE VS. THE CITY OF ROCHESTER.

1. Where city of Rochester had become subscribers to the capital stock of a Railroad, under a special Act of Assembly, held, that the contract was void. as being
in violation of the Constitution of New York.

The rights of emincut domain and

taxation considered.
2. The power to tax property in aid of a private corporation, or for the purchase of
its stock, is not among the ordinary powers of a municipal government, and
requires special legislation to confer it, and this legislation is, in New York, pro-

hibited by the constitution.

Per ALLES, J.

3. The principle settled in Barto vs. Ilimrod, 4 Seld. 488, recognized and approved.

The plaintiff brings this action to recover the money paid upon a
contract between the parties, bearing date March 2d, 1853, in
respect to three hundred thousand dollars of the capital stock of
the Genesee Valley Railroad Oompany, for which the defendants,
in their corporate capacity, had become subscribers under the provisions of chapter 889 of the laws of 1851, and in part payment
for which they had issued and sold the bonds of the city to the
amount of one hundred thousand dollars.
By the agreement between the parties, the plaintiff agreed to
purchase of the defendants the stock subscribed for by them, and to
pay for the same at the times and in the manner particularly spe-cified, and the defendants agreed to issue the city bonds for the
remaining two hundred thousand dollars, and deliver the same to
the plaintiff from time to time, as provided by the contract.
The plaintiff has paid to the city at different times, in part perforrance of the contract on his part, the aggregate sum of fortyone 1housand scv-CL hundred and forty dollars, and has received on
19
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the premiums of the bonds sold by the city, and which, in pursuance of the terms of the agreement, were paid to the plaintiff, and
by way of interest paid by the Railroad Company upon the payments made by the city upon their subscription, the sum of twentysix thousand five hundred and forty-one dollars and eighty-seven
cents.
The cause was tried at the Monroe Circuit, by the court, without
a jury.
S. Matthews, for plaintiff.
E. Griffin and 0. Hastings, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALLEN, J.-The plaintiff bases his claim to recover, in this action,
in the want of power in the city of Rochester to become a subscriber to, or holder of the capital stock of the Genesee Valley Railroad Company, or to issue the bonds of the city for the purposes
mentioned in the agreement of the parties, claiming that the law
under which the defendants have assumed to act in the premises,
is unconstitutional and void. The provisions of the statute under
which the authority was assumed by the defendants, make a part
of an act amending the act to amend and consolidate the several
acts relating to the city of Rochester. (Chapter 889 of Laws of
1851.)
Sections 285 to 292 of that act, inclusive, provide for the borrowing by the Common Council, on the faith and credit of the city,
of three hundred thousand dollars, and the execution of bonds therefor, under their corporate seal, and the investment of the money
thus raised in the stock of the Genesee Valley Railroad Company,
by a subscription to, or a purchase of, such stock, and for the holding, management and disposal of the stock, the receipt of the dividends, and the collection by tax upon the real and personal estate
of the city, of any sums necessary to defray the interest upon the
bonds after the application of the dividends to that purpose. By
section 291, it is declared that the sections conferring this power
upon the Common Council, and prescribing the mode of its execu-
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tion (285 to 291) should not take effect until they should have been
submitted to the electors of the city, at an election to be held as in
the act prescribed.
A city, as a public municipal corporation, organized for political
and governmental purposes, is in many respects subject to different
rules from those which are applicable to mere private corporations.
The binding force of the organic law upon the corporators does not
depend at all upon their assent to its terms, and there is nothing in
the charter, or act of organization, having the effect of a contract
between the State and the body corporate thus formed. City
governments are said to be imperia in irperio; they are auxiliaries
to the government, having the privilege of managing their own local
interests, under the authority and protection of the State.
The city authorities, representing the people secondarily to the
legislature, can only be invested with that power over the property
3f the individual citizen which the people primarily, or the legislature as the representatives of all the people, originally possessed.
In other words, while private corporations may be formed for any
and all lawful purposes, the corporations by accepting of the charter,
u-senting to and becoming bound by its terms, and the sovereign as
-"ell as the corporators being bound by the contract thus expressed,
a mnicipal corporation can only be formed for political purposes,
atnd invested with such powers as are necessary or incidental to the
l'urposes of a local government. The sovereign power by which
th: col poration is created, may repeal, alter or modify the charter.
The powers conferred are mere municipal regulations, subject to the
akcolute control of the government, with the qualification that the
power delegated to the subordinate legislature cannot exceed that
possessed by the legislature from which the power is immediately
derived.
The legislature of the State cannot do that by a local and subordinate legislative body, deriving all their powers from it, which it
could not do directly by its o*wn proper legislative enactment. The
legislative power of the State is vested in the Senate and Assembly.
This power is rot defined by the constitution, but constant restriclioins and limitations upon its exercise, are imposed by it, and subject
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to the restrictions and limitations of that instrument, the power of
the legislature acting in the place of and representing the people,
is ample to do all the people could rightfully do. The restrictions
are either imposed in express terms, or are the result of a necessary implication from the language employed, or the powers
expressly conferred. For example, the constitution by authorizing
the appropriation of private property to public use, and in a single
instance for a private use, impliedly declares that for any other
purpose private property shall not be taken-per Savage, Chief
Justice, in the matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend. Rep. 149. The
constitution has been denominated the commission of the legislature, within the pale of which they must act, and one great utility
of constitutions in a government like ours, consists in defining with
some accuracy the boundaries within which the powers of the several departments of the government are limited, and the protection
thus afforded to the individual citizen, against the encroachment of
delegated power, which is said to be always aggressive. There is
no provision in the constitution of this State, in terms prohibiting
the legislature from compelling the citizen, either individually or
in communities, against their will, to become shareholders in companies formed for the construction of canals, railroads, manufacturing, commercial, or other purposes, or denying to the legislature the right to judge for the citizen what investments of capital
shall be made by him, or in what business he shall embark, either
with a view to a profitable return, or to the benefit of his property
at large, or the greater benefit of the public; neither is such power
conferred, and its assumption is adverse to the spirit of the whole
instrument, and inconsistent with the just rights of the people.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation; and but one case is recognized as a
fit case for the taking of private property for private purposes, and
that is the case of a necessary private road, which being expressly
provided for according to well established rules of construction,
excludes every other case. Art. 1, §§ 6, T. The credit of the
State shall not in any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of
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any individual, association or corporation, (Art. 7,§ 9,) and an effort
was made by § 12 of the same article, to restrict the power of the
legislature to contract debts, by or on behalf of the State, even for
the legitimate public purposes. That the effort has not proved successful, does not detract from the force of the provision, as evidence
of the intent of its framers.
And sections 13 and 14 are designed to induce caution in the imposition of taxes by the legislature.
It is also enjoined upon the legislature to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their power
of taxation, assessment, borrowing money and contracting debts,
and loaning their credit ; so as to prevent abuses in assessments,
and in contracting debts by such municipal corporations. Art. 8,

§9.
These several provisions brought together tend to show the general scopc and design of the instrument, and the intent of its framers,
and thus throw some light upon particular provisions bearing more
directly upon the question before me, and aid in their construction;
at least, they show that it was no part of the design of its framers
to confer any enlarged or doubtful powers upon the State or .Punicipal legislatures over the property of the citizen.
The property of the citizen is, to some extent, in the power and at
the disposal of the government. Its use may to some extent be
regulatcd. It may be forfeited for crime; it may be condemned
by appropriate process ns injurious to the health or morals of tbe
public, or to the well-being and safety of the State; it is lialle to
be taken for public purlposes upon just compensation made; and it
i.liable to taxation and assessment for the general purposes of the
g( vernment, or for local benefits and improvements. But the citize i does not hold his property by so slight a tenure that it cf n be
.:..
en from him by the legislature, for any and all purposes, either
urder the guise and f.rm of taxation, or color and pretent:e of
exercising any of the other. recognized powers of the government.
Al' iowcr in the lcgi.lature over the property of the citizen is
de-i- ed from the people, and is either expressly conferred :y the
ler'lis oi the constitution, cr impliedly grant a'.as incidental to some
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power expressly given, or results from the necessities of government,
and exists as an incident to government.
I know of but two ways in which, except by process of law, the
property of an individual may, without his consent, be taken from
him, or in any way encumbered. The one is in virtue of the right
of eminent domain, for which provision is made by the constitution,
and the other is by taxation, the right of which is necessarily inherent in the government. The citizen is protected against any other
attempt upon his property, by the declaration that he shall not be
deprived of it except by due process of law.
The proceedings of the Common Council of the city of Rochester,
by which they have undertaken to bind the corporation, and to
this extent burthen and encumber the taxable property of the city,
for the payment of three hundred thousand dollars in return for a
like amount of capital stock of a railroad company, is not an attempt
to take property by due process of law, which imports a suit instituted and conducted according to the present forms. Talor vs.
Porter,4 Hill Rep. 140. Neither is it, nor is it claimed, to be an
attempt to exercise the right of eminent domain, the power to
exercise which may be delegated by the legislature to a municipal
corporation to be exercised within the territorial limits of the city
or village.
The right of eminent domain operates upon an individual,-the
right of taxation upon a community, or a class of persons in a
community. People vs. Brooklyn, 4 Comstock Rep. 419. The
authority of the-legislature to confer upon the Common Council the
power to purchase or subscribe to the capital stock of the Genesee
Valley Railroad Company, and to borrow money upon the corporate
bonds of the city to pay for the same, if it exists, must rest for its
foundation upon the right of taxation, which- is a right existing of
necessity. Although the projectors of the law, and those who
favored its sanction by the electors of the city of Rochester, may
not have supposed that the act of subscription to, or the purchase
of the stock of the company, and the payment therefor in the bonds
of the city, would result in any actual burthen to the tax-payers;
and although it is possible that in no event would loss or harm
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come to the city, and that property holders will realize all the
benefits, direct and indirect, which were anticipated from the construction of the road, and the stock received will redeem the bonds
of the city, and in the meantime by dividends of its earnings meet
the interest as it accrues, it must nevertheless be treated for all
purposes as a burthen to the amount of the bonds and the accumulating interest imposed by the sovereign power upon the taxable
property of the city, and whether payable by tax, to be raised this
year or in 1873, is immaterial so far as any principle is involved on
the question of authority.
If the legislature or the Common Council, acting under its authority, had the right to charge the taxable inhabitants and property of
the city with the payment of this large amount in 1873, they had
the right, and a better and clearer right, to require its payment in
1856, or by tax to be levied at once upon their own property,
rather than that of posterity, who have no voice in the matter. For
the power being conceded, there is no jurisdiction vested anywhere
to control or regulate its exercise. In matters within its jurisdiction the legislature is supreme,-it cannot be controlled as to the
amount of taxes, where it may lawfully impose any, or the mode,
manner, or time of their collection.
The act contemplates a deficiency of dividends to meet the accruing interest, and therefore provides that the deficiency shall be met
by a tax upon the property of the city, and it also contemplates a
possibh, ale of the stock below par, and in that event, the necessary
result v ould be a tax to redeem the bonds to the amount of the
defleic,, y. But it is sufficient for the purposes of this case, that
the burt en is imposed upon the property of the city by the execution of the corporate bonds, which, if the law is valid, may be
enforced against the city by tax. Could, then, the legislature of the
State, dlirectly by act of its own, or indirectly by act of the Common (.uncil; proceeding in subordination to, and by authority of
the 1. .:islature, have imposed a tax of S300,000 upon the taxable
proper-y nf the city, to be paid when collected to the Genesee Valley Ia rowd Comupany, or any holder of its stock, whether named in
the act or nlt. upon -tbe transfer to the city authorities of that
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amount of the stock of that road-? It is clearly a question as to
the right of taxation, and not of eminent domain. Judge Ruggles,
in The People vs. Brooklyn, says; "that money cannot be exacted
by the government by right of eminent domain, excepting, perhaps,
for the direct use of the State at large, and when the State at large
is to make compensation."
"The framers of the constitution
could not have intended to delegate to municipal corporations the
right of taking money under this power, because it is entirely
unnecessary."
Taxation is an incident to sovereignty, and by it the public burthens are apportioned among those who ought, in the judgment of
the legislature, to bear them, and it is said by Chief Justice Marshall,
in .McCullock vs. Maryland, 4 Wheaton Rep. 316,- "that as the
exigencies of the government cannot be limited, the people of a
State impose no limits to the exercise of this right of taxation,"
and the same doctrine is asserted in substance, by the same judge,
in The Providence Bank vs. Billings, 4 Peters' Rep. 514. Both
cases, however, assume that taxes are only to be imposed to meet
the exigencies of the State for the discharge of the public burthens,
and that it is only those burthens in the apportionment and levying
of which the legislature of a State is supreme, or in regard to which
they have "any authority. Judge Ruggles in the case before cited,
says: "Taxation exacts money or services from individuals, as
and for their respective shares of contributionto any public burthen."
In The State Bank of Ohio vs. Knoop, 16 How. Rep. 869,
McLean, Justice, in pronouncing the judgment of the court, says:
"The power of taxation has been compared to that of eminent
domain, and it is said as regards the question before us, they are
substantially the same. These powers exist in the same sovereignty,
but their exercise involves different principles. Property may be
appropriated for public purposes, but it must be paid for. Taxes
are assessed on property for the support of the government, under a
legislative act."
Whenever a tax is imposed by the sovereign power of the State,
it will be assumed, unless the contrary clearly appear by the act
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itself, that an exigency or necessity existed, and that it is as for a
part of the public burthen proper; and if in any case a law of the
State imposing a general tax should be held invalid for want of
jurisdiction, it must be palpable that the public are not in any
manner interested in it, as would be the case of a law, directing a
tax to be levied and the avails given to a particular individual,
or appropriated to some admitted private purpose, in which the
public had no concern, and from which they could derive no benefit.
That'the right of taxation for such a purpose is among the reserved
rights of the people over the property of tlhe State, or among the
inherent powers of the government, I am not prepared to believe.
The legislature may, in legislating for a particular locality,
regulate the burthens and expenses of its government, and make
the property of the locality to bear all the burthens and expenses
incident to its government; this power may be delegated to a local
legislature, as the Common Council of a city. But the local
burthens to be borne must, I think, be confined to the expenses
incident to the locality, and the particular community sought to be
taxed.
The city of Rochester' could not proicrly be taxed for the support of the local government of the city of Auburn. The legislature might provide by law a proper police for the city, make all
necessary sanitary regulations, cause all necessary streets to be
laid out, opened and worked, and all local improvements to be
made, and do whatever else, within the locality, they should deem
proper for the good government of the community, and assess the
expenses as a part of the public burthen, upon the community for
whose benefit the expenses should be incurred, or such part of the
community as they should think ought, by reason of particular
benefits, to be charged, and this power may be delegated to the
Common Council of a city for the locality embraced within its
boundaries.
But the jurisdiction of the substituted legislature is strictly local,
and the burthens which they are authorized to impose upon the cons tituent body, must be directly incidental to their government, and
be strictly such as concern them as a community bound together
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by their charter, for municipal purposes. A city or other locality
may be taxed by reason of local benefits, for a public work, beyond
what the residue of the State is taxed for the same object. Thoma8
vs. Leland, 24 Wend. Rep. 65. The entire work is a public work, and
its cost a public burthen, in the apportionment of which the legislature have a discretion which cannot be controlled. This does not
prove that every project requiring the expenditure of money is a
public burthen, the proper subject of a tax, because the legislature,
State or local, so elect to name it; and it by no means follows, that
they can be taxed for tfie benefit of a private corporation, although
the work undertaken by it is so far public that it will be considered
as representing the State in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain in the entering upon and taking property necessary to its
construction. A bill appropriating the public moneys or property
to the use of such a corporation, would require a two-thirds vote of
the legislature, as an appropriation of the public moneys, &c., to a
private purppse. Constitution, Art. 1, § 9. Smith on Statutes,
&c., 418 and § 29.
But the acts of the Legislature and Common Council involved in
this action, do not profess to impose a tax, or to provide for a tax
infuturo, either absolutely or upon any contingency, in aid of the
construction of any work, public or private. They simply provide
for a certain number of shares of the capital stock of a private corporation, in virtue of which the city is to become a shareholder,
with all the rights, privileges and liabilities of other shareholders.
The building of the road contemplated, may or may not be of
great incidental advantage to the city of Rochester, and greatly
appreciate the value of real property within its limits, but this being
conceded, it will be difficult to prove that the purchase of the stock
in the company is within the legitimate power of the legislature or
the Common Council, or that its cost is among the burthens which
can be the proper subject of taxation. The building of manufacto.
ries, the establishment of large commercial houses, and extensive
business and commercial operations, and the building and sailing of
vessels, may be each and all essential to the prosperity of a city,
and may all be accomplished by incorporated or unincorporated
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associations, organized for the purpose ; but it has not, that I am
aware of, been supposed that a city could properly become a partner or stockholder in any such association, and levy by tax upon the
property of the city, the necessary contributions for the purpose.
If so, then a city can, by act of the legislature, become one vast
railroad, manufacturing or commercial corporation, or if thought
sest, a banking association. If individuals choose to invest their
.roperty or credit in enterprises of that character, they may do so,
and no law will be invoked to prohibit it, but the option whether to
embark in them or not, should be, and I think is, with the individual
citizen, and not with his representatives in the city or State government. It is not necessary to say that municipal corporations may
not in any case exercise a special franchise vested in them by the
legislature, with a view to the increase of their revenue, an enhancement of the public property, or a diminution of the necessarypublic
expenditures.
The right of taxation, however, can only be exercised either by
the legislature or the municipal corporation, in respect to the proper
public burthens incident to the city government and the exercise of
the political powers ; for'as to such only does the necessity of taxation exist, and not to enable the city government to become traders,
merchants, bankers, ship-owners, manufacturers, or shareholders or
partners in business associations, incorporated or unincorporated.
And a special franchise thus to deal with the property of the citizen, cannot rightly be exercised by the government, or municipal
corporations formed under it.
To become dealers in stocks of private corporations, with a view
to profit, or stockholders with a view to future revenue, is not one
of the incidents of a city government, to accomplish which they may
tax the property within the city limits.
In the nature of things, there can be no necessity for the exercise
of such a power, and as the right of taxation restsupon the necessities of the case, the power. cannot exist. That the work contemplated by the private corporation may, and probably will, prove
beneficial to the interests of the city, does not vary the question.
The purchasc of the stock by the city may or way ~ot Lbe cssential
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to enable the corporation to perform its contract. It is enough that
the city do not undertake the work, but merely become stock dealers, and they are not even bound to aid the company by subscribing
to the stock-they may go into the market and buy it of the stockholders.
The work is in no way, and by no act recognized or treated as a
public work, to be done by and at the expense, and for the benefit
of the city, and as one of the legitimate duties resting on the city
government. The decision of this question might, I think, very
properly be rested in the absence of any express power conferred by
the people in the constitution, and aside from any of the prohibitory
and restraining clauses in that instrument, upon the absolute want
of power in municipal corporations to burthen or tax the property
of the citizen for the purpose named, and the want of jurisdiction in
the State by legislation to confer the right. But the prohibitions of
the constitution are, I think, ample to protect the citizen against
taxes and burthens of this nature. Without referring more particularly now to the several provisions of the constitution in restraint
of the power of the legislature over the property and credit of the
whole State, and which would seem, in their spirit, to prohibit the
granting of a power to a local government, in respect to the property and credit of a local community, which is expressly denied to
the State government in respect to the entire public, I will simply
refer to a provision which, I think, expressly forbids the legislature
to grant the power which the act in question assumes to confer upon
the Common Couincil of Rochester. The 9th section of article 8, was
designed for the protection of the tax-payers, in cities and villages,
against unwise and inexpedient taxation for purposes within the
scope of the ordinary municipal legislature, and imposes a duty upon
the legislature in respect to it. This duty, so far as a positive duty
is enjoined, it is true, is one of imperfect obligation, and may not be
enforced, and that it has been so esteemed by the legislature upon
whom it was designed to act, is quite clear from an inspection of
the Session Laws of the State from 1846 to the present time.
But of the propriety of restricting the power of cities in the
exercise of their proper functions, in the respects named in this see-
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tion, the legislature must of necessity, be the exclusive judges, and
it must be assumed by the other departments of the government,
that what they have done, or omitted to do, in this direction, has
been for good and sufficient reasons and in the exercise of a sound
discretion.
Bat the section has a wider scope, and in the duty enjoined to restrict the power of the municipal legislatures to tax the property, or
loan the credit of cities and villages, there is by a very plain and
necessary implication, an absolute prohibition to enlarge their
powers. A discretion is vested in the legislature as to the restriction,
but none whatever in regard to the granting of new and enlarged
powers in respect to taxation, and the creation of debts.
The power to tax property in aid of a private corporation, or for
the purchase of its stock, is not among the ordinary powers of a
municipal and local government, and require special legislation to
confer it, and this special legislation is, I think, clearly prohibited
by this section of ile constitution.
Without this effect the provision is but an expression of opinion,
a recimmendation to the legislature, to which heed may or may not
be given, and to give it significance and any effect as a part of the
fundamental law of the land, it must be construed as an absolute restriction upon the powers of the legislature in conferring powers
upon municipal corporations. This is its spirit and interest, and it
must have this effect, or it has no practical force. There was an
attempt to amend the provision, so as to save by implication, debts
before contracted by cities and villages, but the amendment was
negatived, and the section was adopted with only two dissenting
votes, as it was introduced, and without amendment. Debates of Convention, Argus ed. 829. In the judgment of the convention, municipal corporations, in the exercise of their ordinary political functions,
needed legislative restraint, and that their powers to tax the property, or charge the city with a debt, could not, with a due regard
to the rights of its property holders and citizens, be enlarged; and
in this sec:ion they have in substance and effect so said, and by it
the legislalvc power of the State'is restricted and limited: and as
the act in -luestion is in contravention of this provision of the constitution i' is void.
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Again, within the principle settled by the Court of Appeals, in
Barto vs. fimrod, 4 Seld. Rep. 488, the act of the legislature,
under which the defendants assumed to act, is unconstitutional and
void, for the reason that the fact of its becoming a law was made
to depend upon the result of a popular vote. The authority to
incorporate cities and villages, to prescribe their boundaries and
define their powers and the mode and manner of their execution is
devolved upon the legislature, and they cannot delegate this power,
or devolve the duty upon any other body. I am unable to distinguish this case from that cited.
To what extent the sovereign power of the State was to be delegated to and vested in the Common Council of the city; in what
cases, and to what extent they should possess the power, to charge
the taxable property of the city, by immediate taxation, or by contracting debts to be paid in the future, and what in all respects
should be the extent of the discretion and power of the Council as the
local legislature for the territory embraced withi the boundaries of
the city, should have been definitely settled by the legislature as
peculiarly within their province. The expediency of laws of this
character is to be judged of by the legislature, and they cannot
shrink from the constitutional responsibility resting upon them.
It is not the case of a law conferring new powers, or additional
franchises upon a private corporation, which the corporation may
elect to accept or not, as they deem expedient. This is the case of
a law.making provision for the government of a portion of the State,
the exercise of a portion of the sovereign power of the State in a
particular locality, and over the inhabitants residing within certain
territorial limits, and all the people of that locality, as well as of the
entire State, had committed it to the legislature to make and
declare the law in that, as in every other matter under the constitution, and the minority have never agreed that a law passed by a
majority vote at a popular election, should bind them or their
estates, whether such law affects the whole State, or only a small
portion of it. The vote of the city, as provided for by the act, was
not to advise or control the Common Council in the exercise of their
discretion in the matter of subscribing for the stock and issuing the
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city bonds after the law had taken effect, but to decide whether the
act vesting the discretion in the Council should become a law or not,
which is the very case decided in Barto vs. Rimrod. It would
have been different, had the act of the legislature vested the power
in the city government, but restricted the Common Council in its
exercise, and made the exercise to depend upon the contingency of
a favorable expression by the electors of the city ; but the question
submitted was, whether the power should ble conferred upon the city
council to act in the premises, which rendered the law unconstitutional and void.
It followed, if I am right upon either of the three propositions
considered, that the contract between the parties is absolutely void,
and that the defendants cannot perform the same upon their part,
and that if they in form fulfill their agreement and execute and
deliver to the plaintiff the corporate bonds of the city, according to
its terms, they would be worthless. The agreement of the plaintiff
is therefore without consideration, and could not be enforced against
him, and the money paid by him in part performance was paid
without consideration, and may be recovered back in this action.
The contract is still executory, and being incapable of performance
without fault in the plaintiff, may be rescinded by him and an action
maintained for the recovery of the money paid.
The defendants have received so much money, which, ex crquo et
bono, belongs to the plaintiff. Chitty on Contracts, 622, 3-636, 7 ;
Young vs. Cole, 3 Bing. N. C. 724; Morgan vs. Groff, 4 Barb.
Rep. 524; lRiec vs. Peet, 15 Johns. Rep. 503; Gillett vs. K1aynard, 5 Johns. Rep. 85; White vs. Franclin Bank, 22 Pick.
Rep. 181.
The plaintiff has, however, received certain sums of money from
the defendants, and upon their order or draft upon the railroad corporation, which should be accounted for by him.
To this extent he has been benefited by the contract and by the
acts of the defendants in the transation, and has received money
to which he is not entitled, and which, but for the contract, would
have been received by the defendanz. This is the proper subject
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of a set-off in this action, and must be deducted from the amount
paid by the plaintiff.
This amount he has received from the defendants, and is estopped from denying their title to it. Judgment must be given for the
plaintiff for the balance, with interest, to wit, $18,527 54.1
T the Supreme Court of New York-Oswego General Terri, 1856.
ISAAC H. BROWN against JACOB GOLDSMITH ET AL.
1. When a party calls for a part that was said at an interview of the parties, it does
not follow that the other party may show all that was said. He may show so
much of the conversation as made a part of the negotiations, or a part of the res
gesta.
2. The court will not grant a new trial, even if the ruling of the judge was wrong;

if upon the whole case justice has been done.

This action was upon a contract to pay the plaintiff a certain sum
for making collections. The contract was by parol. The evidence
showed the defendant settled the suit after the plaintiff had commenced, and without the consent of the plaintiff, on the ground that
the plaintiff had sued a party that he agreed not to prosecute.
The plaintiff in this suit showed by a witness that he was present
when the defendants settled the suit. The defendants' counsel
asked for all that was said at that interview, 'with the intention of
showing 'what the defendants said about plaintiff's taking the claim.
The justices trying the cause admitted the evidence, and the jury
returned a verdict for the defendants.
The plaintiff appealed.
Charles Andrews, for plaintiff.
N. F. Graves, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BACON, J.-I am inclined to think that the testimony allowed to
be given on cross-examination of the 'witness, Rosenbeck, was improperly admitted. It was on the presumption that a portion of
the conversation had been given, and the defendants were entitled
1 The reader is referred to the cases of Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 9 Harris, 147-

188; 2 Am. Law Reg., 1, 27, 85; Moers v. Reading, 9 Harris, 188-203.-Eds.
Am. Law Reg.
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to the whole, but as the case reads, no such foundation seems to
have been laid for its introduction. But the same facts, in substance, were afterwards proved by the witness, Rosenbaum, and I
can see no valid objection to his testimony. It was not in conflict
with any thing stated in the letters which alluded to a verbal agreement, which this testimony explained and illustrated. If there had
been no cross-examination of Rosenbeck, the jury were well warranted, by the testimony of Rosenbaum, in arriving at the conclusion they did. The case was put to the jury as one of conflicting
testimony between Rosenbaum and the son of the plaintiff, and as
between the two, it is evident they believed the former told the
truth, no injustice having been done, the verdict should not be set
aside.
The judgment, in my opinion, should, accordingly, be
affirmed.
ALVEN, J.-I am of opinion that -the justice erred in admitting
evidence of the declaration of defendants at the time they settled
the debt against Adler & Gravenn. The plaintiff had not called
for any declarations of the defendant on that occasion. They had
proved a fact, to wit :-the compromise and discharge of the debt;
and it would probably have been competent for defendants to prove
what was said concerning the settlement, and so much of the conversation as made a part of the negotiation as a part. of the
res gest2, and to show what was done, and had the plaintiff
called for any part of the conversation, the defendants could only
have given so. much of the residue of the conversation,, as tended to
qualify that given in evidence by the plaintiffs, and no more; that
is, they could have given all upon the same subject.' But there is
no pretence that the plaintiff had directly or indirectly called for
any declarations of the defendants concerning, the agreement
between them, and the conversation was admitted under the offer to
show "1what defendant may have said about plaintiff's taking the
claim." The evidence was erroneously admitted, and we cannot say
that it did not influence the result.
The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted ; casts to.
abide events. New trial granted.
I See I Greenl. on Evid.

20

t08.-M~s.-Am. Law Req.

